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ARTICLES
CONSTRUING THE CANON:
AN EXEGESIS OF REGULATORY
TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE AFTER
LINGLE V CHEVRON
BY MICHAEL B. KENT, JR.*
INTRODUCTION

It is by now axiomatic that regulatory takings jurisprudence
over the last three decades has been "muddled,"1 "confused,",2 and
"a constitutional quagmire."3 Since the Supreme Court's 1978
decision in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New
York 4 (which attempted to provide some guidelines by which to
determine when a regulatory action would trigger the Takings
Clause), this area has been a murky sea of competing theories,
alternative analytical tests, and seemingly results-oriented
decision-making. Almost from the beginning of its tangled affair
with regulatory takings, the Supreme Court conflated the
distinction between two constitutional inquiries: when a land use
regulation offended notions of due process and when the same
Assistant Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School, Atlanta, Georgia.
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is
Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984); see also Stewart E. Sterk, The
FederalistDimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence,114 YALE L.J. 203,
205 (2004) ("Conventional wisdom teaches that the Supreme Court's takings
doctrine is a muddle.").
2 D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential
Long-Term
Impact of Lingle v. Chevron and the Separationof Takings and Substantive Due
Process, 69 ALB. L. REV. 343, 343 (2005) ("Regulatory takings often is
considered one of the most doctrinally confused areas of constitutional law.");
John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 171, 172 (2005) (mentioning "the widespread view that regulatory takings
is an especially confused field of law").
3 Mark W. Cordes, Takings Jurisprudenceas Three-Tiered Review, 20 J.
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2006).

4 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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regulation resulted in property takings.5 Similarly, as Eric R.
Claeys recently noted, the Court has utilized rival conceptions of6
"private property" and the proper role of regulations affecting it.
Finally, the Court has formulated no less than five different tests
for analyzing regulatory takings challenges, 7 all but one of which
was established in a split decision, 8 and it has offered seemingly
opposing explanations of how various issues arising within those
tests should be resolved. The result has been a general absence of
predictability, coherence, or confidence in the Court's
consideration of regulatory takings claims. As Justice Stevens has
lamented, "[e]ven the wisest lawyers would have to acknowledge
great uncertainty about the scope of [the] Court's takings
jurisprudence." 9
In 2005, however, the Court made substantial strides in
bringing some clarity to the law of regulatory takings. In Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., the Court selectively admitted its past
doctrinal errors and rejected one of its leading formulations for
determining when a regulatory taking has occurred--the
"substantially advances" test.' 0 This test, which found its seminal
expression in Agins v. City of Tiburon,11 suggested that a
regulation works a taking under the Fifth Amendment if it "does
' See Robert G. Dreher, Lingle's Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due
Processfrom Takings Doctrine, 30 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 371, 373-87 (2006)
(discussing influence of substantive due process doctrine on regulatory takings
jurisprudence); Gary Lawson, et al., "Oh Lord, Please Don't Let Me Be
Misunderstood!": Rediscovering the Matthews v. Eldridge and Penn Central
Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 24-29 (2005); Daniel A. Jacobs,
Indigestion From Eating Crow. The Impact ofLingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. on
the Future ofRegulatory Takings Doctrine, 38 URB. LAW. 451, 457-58 (2006).
6 See Eric R. Clacys, The Penn Central Test and Tensions in Liberal
Property Theory, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 339, 349-66 (2006) (discussing the
"classical approach", the "modem approach", and the decisions in which they
were applied).
7 See infra Part I.
8 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396, 411 (1994) (5-4 decision);
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1005 (1992) (6-3
decision); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 842, 866 (1987)
(5-4 decision); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
442 (1982) (6-3 decision); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (6-3 decision). See also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 255 (1980) (wherein Justice Powell delivered the opinion for the unanimous
court).
9 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
Agins, 447 U.S. 255.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

2008]

REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCEAFTER LINGLE

65

not substantially advance legitimate state interests."' 2 In Lingle,
the Court unanimously held that "this formula prescribes an
inquiry in the nature of due process .. that has no proper place in
our takings jurisprudence.
Through Lingle, the Court reduced
the number of takings tests by explicitly overruling a prior decision
that contributed substantially to the takings muddle. This is no
small feat from a Court that has shown a penchant for finding
consistency between conflicting precedents. As Benjamin Barros
has commented, "[o]ne admirable trait of the Court's opinion in
Lingle14is its recognition that its precedents in this area are not holy
writ.
But Lingle does more than demonstrate the Court's
willingness to overrule tarnished decisions.
In addition to
overruling Agins, the Court unanimously reaffirmed five other
decisions that, when read in conjunction with Lingle and with one
another, begin to provide a comprehensible framework for how the
Court thinks about regulatory takings. Thus, while Lingle admits
that not all of the Court's prior takings cases are holy writ, it
nonetheless establishes certain decisions as canonical. And while
this "canon" does not explicitly answer every question about
regulatory takings, it provides considerable insight into the Court's
thoughts about how those questions should be answered.
This Article seeks to shed light on those thoughts and,
concomitantly, to assist theorists, judges, practitioners, and law
students in finding their way out of the regulatory takings
quagmire.
To that end, this Article endeavors primarily to
elucidate the post-Lingle state of regulatory takings law and does
not intend to provide a comprehensive evaluation of whether the
Court necessarily "gets it right." It is my aim to show that by
analyzing the Lingle "canon" exegetically--that is, by its own
language and contexts, seeking to interpret each decision in light
of the others--one can begin to discern a clearer and more orderly
picture of the law of regulatory takings.
Part I provides a brief overview of some the Court's more
significant pre-Lingle takings decisions. This overview is intended
to provide a basic understanding of the state of regulatory takings
doctrine at the time Lingle was decided, and the discussion of these
2

See id. at 260.

Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540.
14 Barros, supra note 2, at 356 n.60.
'3
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cases, therefore, is by no means exhaustive. With the contextual
picture having been painted, Part II focuses on Lingle itself. After
discussing the background of the litigation and the Court's
unanimous opinion, Part II concludes that, by establishing an
authoritative "canon" of regulatory takings decisions, the Lingle
Court made great strides toward clarifying its jurisprudence in this
area of constitutional analysis. Part III attempts an exegesis of this
"canon," seeking to divine the intent of the Court through an
analysis of the language and context of the Supreme Court's
takings decisions as if they were components of a single, unified
text. In this regard, Part III seeks to derive from the cases the
overarching themes and fundamental characteristics of regulatory
takings. Additionally, Part III attempts to elucidate the application
of the various tests established by the Court, concluding that the
"canon" forms two basic frameworks that paint a more or less
consistent picture of takings analysis. The Conclusion raises some
questions still left unanswered by the Lingle "canon."
I. THE PRE-LINGLE MUDDLE
A.

The Penn Central and Agins Tests

Although the notion that regulatory action can amount to a
taking of private property has been extant for well over a century,15
the starting point for much of the modern confusion about
regulatory takings is the Court's decision in Penn Central
TransportationCompany v. City of New York. 16 In Penn Central,
the Court deliberately avoided establishing any "set formula" for
determining when a regulatory taking occurs. 17 Instead, the Court
described the proper analysis as an "essentially ad hoc, factual
inquir[y]" that is rooted in due process notions of "justice and
fairness" and "depends largely upon the particular circumstances
'5See James W. Ely, Jr., "PoorRelation " Once More: The Supreme Court
and the Vanishing Rights of Property Owners, 2004-2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
39, 42-43 (2005) ("By the late nineteenth century courts and commentators were
considering whether a regulation might so diminish the value or usefulness of
property as to be tantamount to a taking without physical interference or
acquisition of title."); accord Lawson, et al., supra note 5, at 25 ("From the
nineteenth century onward, courts have consistently assumed that some
governmental actions other than formal transfers of title can amount to takings of
property ....).
16 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
17 See id. at 124.
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[in each] case."' 8 The Court identified "several factors that have
particular significance" to this ad hoc investigation, including "the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations," as well as "the character
of the governmental action."' 9 Despite identifying these factors as
being significant, it is not clear that the Court intended them to be
anything more than broad analytical guidelines. 20 The Court
provided no further explanation of these factors, and (as any firstyear law student attempting to analyze the decision can attest) it
paid little attention to them throughout the remainder of the
opinion, 2' other than explaining that the factors were to be
considered in relation to "the parcel as a whole" rather than the
individual segments (such as surface, superiacent, and subjacent
rights) that make up the parcel.22
The next year, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the Court had
occasion to repeat the Penn Central factors, but it still offered no
23
real insight into their meaning or proper application.
Nonetheless, Kaiser Aetna did produce one thing of lasting
significance: it marked the first time that the Court described the
factors in the distinct, tripartite fashion that has become so familiar
to practitioners and scholars today: "the economic impact of the
regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed
24
expectations, and the character of the governmental action.
Eventually, the Court transformed this Kaiser Aetna three-part
formula into "an outcome-determinative test,, 25 a transformation
18 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
19 Id.

20

See Lawson, et al., supra note 5, at 5 (concluding that Penn Central "had

the more modest, but nonetheless important, ambition of providing a framework
or structurefor discussion of the issues arising in takings.., law"); accord
Claeys, supra note 6, at 343 (assuming that Penn Central's three part test was
"originally meant .. to serve a modest, argument-framing function," in which
"the factors act more or less as placeholders, which help lawyers and judges
focus their arguments on a few considerations that everyone can understand").
21 As has been noted by Gary Lawson, Katherine Ferguson, and Guillermo
A. Montero, neither the Court's actual discussion nor the structure of its
argument followed the analysis suggested by the factors outlined by the Court.
Lawson, et al., supra note 5, at 32.
22 See Penn Central,438 U.S. at 130-3 1.
23 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
24 Id. at 175.
25 See Lawson, et al., supra note 5, at 33-34 ("What we know today as the
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that accounts for much of the confusion surrounding regulatory
takings doctrine, as practitioners, judges, and academics have
struggled ever since to determine what the test means and how it
should be applied.2 6
The vagueness of the Penn Central/KaiserAetna framework,
however, is not the only contributing factor to the uncertainty
surrounding this area of the law. Perhaps because the Penn
Central framework was not originally intended to be an outcomedeterminative test, or perhaps because a significant number of
Justices have found it unsatisfactory as such a test, the Court spent
the next two decades establishing alternative formulations by
which to determine whether a regulatory taking had occurred. One
of the more significant of these alternatives came just two years
after Penn Central, in the Court's unanimous opinion in Agins v.
City of Tiburon.2 7 In Agins, the Court suggested that a regulation
works a taking under the Fifth Amendment if it "does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land., 2 8 Applying this disjunctive
test, the Court held that the regulation at issue did substantially
advance legitimate governmental purposes and did not deprive the
landowners of their land's economic viability. 29 Thus, the Court
found that the regulation did not effect a taking of private
property, 30 a holding almost certainly consistent with the outcome
that would have been reached under Penn Central. Despite this
consistency, however, the first half of the Agins formula--known
as the "substantially advances" test-was often repeated by the
Court and eventually came to be regarded as an alternative to the
Penn Central factors. 31 Thus, a takings challenge to government
Penn Central three-part framework is really the Kaiser Aetna three-part
framework.").
16 Criticism of the Penn Central framework
is legion. See id. at 34
(describing academic criticism of Penn Central as being not "a cottage industry"
but rather "an industrial revolution"). For a sampling of recent academic
attempts to explain the Penn Central test see generally Cordes, supra note 3, at

35-40; Echeverria, supra note 2, at 178-210; and Lawson, et al., supra note 5, at
30-50.
27 See generally Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
28 Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
29 Id. at 261-62.
30 Id. at 263.
31 See, e.g., City

of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526
U.S. 687, 704 (1999) (citing to precedents that refer to the Agins "substantially
advances" test).
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action could be analyzed under either of these two distinct tests,
both based on rather amorphous concepts more in keeping with a
due process analysis and capable of yielding very different results
depending on the circumstances of any particular case (including
the agendas or ideologies of the decisionmakers).32
B.

The Context-Specific Tests

Apparently not content with these two alternatives, the Court
throughout the 1980s and 1990s developed three more tests with
which to analyze takings challenges in specific regulatory
contexts. The first of these tests was established in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corporation,33 where the Court
held that a regulatory action that results in a permanent physical
occupation of property is a taking per se, regardless of "the size of
the area permanently occupied. '34 In establishing this bright-line
test, the Court made clear that cases concerning permanent
physical invasions involved neither a balancing of the Penn

Central factors nor an evaluation of the considerations at work in
Agins. 35 Rather, the Court explained "that a permanent physical
32 At least one commentator has hinted that this infusion of due process
concepts into the law of takings was in large part the product of "property rights
advocates" trying to achieve the type of "judicial activism" that is no longer
available under the deferential standards applied to substantive due process
challenges themselves. See Echeverria, supra note 2, at 199. While it may be
true that "property right advocates" have utilized the "substantially advances"
test and its conflation of due process and takings analyses, they are by no means
alone in this regard. Indeed, Justice Brennan, whom few would describe as a
"property rights advocate," linked the takings inquiry to due process notions of
"justice and fairness" and agreed that "a use restriction on real property may
constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a
substantial public purpose." See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104, 123-24, 127 (1978). Likewise, Justice Stevens expressly invoked
the "substantially advances" test in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987), to support the idea that regulations
protecting the public health, safety, or welfare should largely be excepted from
the just compensation requirement regardless of their effects on private property.
See also Barros, supra note 2, at 355 (concluding that rejection of the
"substantially advances" test "represents a setback to taking opponents who, like
Justice Stevens, tend to argue that a government act should not be found to be a
taking when it furthers a really important public purpose"). Finally, as noted
earlier, the Court has confused the similar yet separate due process and takings
inquiries from very early on. See supra note 5 and authorities cited therein; see
also Ely, supra note 15, at 44.
" 458 U.S. 419 (1982).

14 Id. at 436, 441.
31 See id. at 432.
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occupation is a government action of such a unique character that
it is a taking without regard to other factors that a court might
ordinarily examine." 36 Thus, the simple fact that the intrusion
occurred meant that the regulation was a taking requiring just
compensation, regardless of the economic impact on the property
owner or the extent to which the regulation advanced legitimate
state interests.
Ten years after Loretto, the Court announced its second
37
bright-line test in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.
There the Court held that a regulation results in a taking when it
"denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land., 38
Equating such denials with the physical appropriations found to be
per se takings in Loretto,39 the Court concluded that a Lucas type
of regulatory action was similarly subject to "categorical
treatment" as a per se taking. This categorical treatment allowed
the Court to bypass the "case-specific inquiry into the public
interest advanced in support of the restraint" 40 and in doing so, the
Court specifically rejected the idea, drawn from its earlier cases,
that regulations designed to prevent or mitigate public harm enjoy
some sort of exemption from the Fifth Amendment's just
compensation requirement.
The Court's early cases relied on this type of "harmprevention" analysis simply to make the same point that was made
in the first half of the Agins test--that "land-use regulation does
not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state
interests' .... ,41 But the Court acknowledged that inquiries into
the purposes underlying a regulation, especially where the inquiry
seeks to divine whether the regulation is designed to prevent a
harm or confer a benefit, are not entirely helpful for determining
whether the regulation has taken an interest in private property.
Thus, on one hand, Lucas appeared to suggest that the
government's reasons for regulating should be of little
consequence to the takings inquiry, a suggestion that seemed to
undermine much of the rationale behind Agins and a good portion
36 Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 434.
3' 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
38 Id. at 1015.
" See id. at 1017.
40 Id. at 1015.
41 Id. at 1023-24 ((quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 834 (1987) (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260(1980))).
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of the rationale behind Penn Central.
Despite its seeming discomfort with this aspect of its prior
decisions, however, the Court made no assertions that it was
overruling those decisions or that the reasoning used therein
should now be considered verboten. In fact, later in its opinion,
the Lucas Court seemingly resurrected the relevance of the
regulation's underlying purpose, at least in the narrow context of a
total economic deprivation. When such a deprivation occurs, the
Court noted, the regulation is considered a taking unless the
government can show that the uses prohibited by the regulation
would also be proscribed by "background principles of the State's
law of property and nuisance. 4 2 Thus, if the regulation was
designed to "duplicate the result that could have been achieved"
under common law nuisance a an inquiry that ordinarily
considers harms and benefits--no compensation is required
despite the total economic deprivation. a Lucas, then, not only
established another analytical test; by presenting seemingly
converse views about the relevance of a regulation's underlying
purposes, it added further confusion to the law.45
However, the Lucas majority did not stop there. In discussing
what might qualify as a deprivation of all economically beneficial
use (and, therefore, trigger the new "total deprivation" test), the
Court confessed that the answer could not be gleaned from its prior
opinions. 46 The majority explained:
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave
90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we
would analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been
deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened
portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a

42 Id. at 1029.
43 Id.

44 See id. at 1030-31.
41 See, e.g., R. WILSON FREYERMUTH ET AL., PROPERTY AND LAWYERING

964-65 n.2 (2d ed. 2006) (questioning whether Lucas's "background principles"
exception is conceptually any different than the harm/benefit distinction it
purported to reject, and hinting that real difference is which branch of
government-legislative or judicial-does the balancing); Dreher, supra note 5,
at 387 (noting that Lucas "[i]ronically ... affirmed the core principle of the
'nuisance exception"' after "having broadly disclaimed the relevance of the
legislature's purposes to takings doctrine").
46 See Lucas, 505 U.S at 1016 n.7.
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47
mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole.

This remark, which obviously called into question Penn Central's
"parcel as a whole" rule, did little to promote predictability in
regulatory takings analysis, a result that was compounded by the
majority's refusal to answer the very question it had raised.48
The Court's final context-specific test for determining when a
regulation results in a taking was established in two cases-Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission49 and Dolan v. City of
Tigard 5 -involving attempts by the government to condition
regulatory approval of land use proposals on the landowners'
dedication of public easements across their properties. 5' In each
case, the Court began by noting that, had the respective
governments simply promulgated regulations requiring dedication
of the easements, the regulations without question would have
qualified as takings under the Fifth Amendment. 52
Such a
conclusion flowed logically from the Court's prior holding in
Loretto that regulations requiring permanent physical occupations
constituted takings per se. 53 But the Court explained that the
conditional (rather than mandatory) nature of the easements could
make a constitutional difference--provided, that is, that the
conditional easements served some legitimate governmental
purpose. In this regard, the Court explicitly relied on the Agins
"substantially advances" test: "We have long recognized that a
land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially
advance[s] legitimate state interests' . ..., And if those interests
are sufficient to allow the government flatly to deny a proposed
land use, then the government should also be able to offer the
landowner the less drastic alternative of approval subject to a
condition that serves the same interests as would an outright
denial.5 5 Thus, the Court explained, the conditional easements
47 Id.

See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (raising the denominator issue but stating
that "we avoid this difficulty in the present case").
49 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
'oDolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
S' See id. at 380; see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
52 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831.
" See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-32 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432-35 (1982)).
54 Id. at 834 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
5 See id. at 836-37.
48
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would not constitute takings if (but only if) they bore an "essential
nexus" to the same governmental purposes that would justify an
56
outright denial of the land use application.
Although Nollan ended its inquiry at this stage, finding that
no "essential nexus" existed between the easement and the
government's stated purposes in that case, the Dolan Court added
a second step to the analysis. In Dolan, after concluding that the
"essential nexus" sufficiently had been established, the Court
explained that the government also had to demonstrate that there
was a "rough proportionality" between the conditional easement
and the likely impact of the land use plan under consideration.5 7
Put differently, to avoid paying just compensation, the government
had to "make some sort of individualized determination that the
required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development." 5 8 The Court also made
clear that it would show no deference to legislative determinations
in this regard. Conclusory statements are not sufficient to satisfy
the "rough proportionality" burden; rather, the government must
quantify that the condition imposed will, or is likely to, offset the
public burdens expected to result from the proposed land use.5 9
The test established in Nollan/Dolan contributed to the
confusion about regulatory takings in a number of ways. First, by
requiring inquiry into the government's purposes, as well as the
causal connection between those purposes and the regulatory
condition imposed on the land owner, the test seemed to be at
variance with the Court's intervening (albeit schizophrenic)
criticism of such inquiries in Lucas. Indeed, at least on the
surface, the Nollan/Dolan framework had a very Agins-like
quality, intensifying the doctrinal entanglement of due process
with takings analysis.6 ° Second, in the "rough proportionality"
stage, Nollan/Dolan clearly envisions close judicial scrutiny of the
conclusions and methods utilized by the government in support of
16 See id. at 837; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386-87.
57 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391-96.
58 Id. at 391.
'9 Id. at 395-96.
60 See e.g., Daniel Pollak, Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court Tries
to
Prune Agins Without Stepping on Nollan and Dolan, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 925, 929
(2006) ("At first blush, it appears that the Nollan and Dolan rules subject

government regulation to just the sort of means-ends inquiry [established by
Agins].")
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the regulatory condition, a result noticeably at odds with the
deferential posture toward legislative determinations taken in both
Penn Central 61 and Agins. 62 The soundness of this heightened
scrutiny, and what it means in practice, has been the subject of
much debate and disagreement.63 Finally, there has been a lack of
clarity concerning the exact nature of the regulatory conditions to
which Nollan/Dolan is intended to apply. For example, courts and
commentators have disagreed about the applicability of
Nollan/Dolan to monetary exactions (as opposed to physical
dedications of land) 64 and to legislatively-determined development
conditions of general application (as opposed to ad hoc conditions
resulting from adjudicative determinations).6 5
C.

Penn Central and Agins Redux?

As the twentieth century came to a close, and after more than
a decade developing these context-specific tests, the Court
returned its focus to its earlier formulations from Penn Central and
Agins, creating even more disorder in the process. In City of

61 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 134-35
(1978).
62 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980).
63 See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball & Laurie Reynolds, Exactions and Burden
Distribution in Takings Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1516-17 (2006)
(explaining the academic disagreement regarding the holdings in Nollan/Dolan);
Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme
Court's Takings JurisprudenceAffects Local Land Use Decisions,35 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 103, 125-31 (2001) (discussing the academic debate regarding
heightened scrutiny for exactions); see also id. at 142-43 (discussing why
municipal planners favor the Nollan/Dolan decisions).
64 See, e.g., FREYERMUTH ET AL., supra note 45, at 988 (discussing differing
approaches taken by state courts to monetary impact fees); see also Ronald H.
Rosenberg, The ChangingCulture ofAmerican Land Use Regulation: Payingfor
Growth With Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 256-59 (2006) (discussing
differing approaches taken by state courts to monetary impact fees).
65 See Steven A. Haskins, Closing the Dolan Deal--Bridging the
Legislative/Adjudicative Divide, 38 URB. LAW. 487, 496-500 (2006) (reviewing
differing court views on the applicability of Nollan/Dolan to legislative or
adjudicative regulations); Michael B. Kent, Jr., Forming a Tie That Binds:
Development Agreements in Georgia and the Need for Legislative Clarity, 30
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 1, 14 n.66 (2006) (citing to cases that rejected
the application of Nollan/Dolan to regulations that were legislative); Christopher
T. Goodin, Comment, Dolan v. City of Tigard and the Distinction Between
Administrative and Legislative Exactions: "A Distinction Without a
ConstitutionalDifference," 28 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 148-57 (2005) (reviewing

cases).
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Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,66 for example, the
Court expressly declined to revisit the "substantially advances" test
from Agins. 67 Additionally, despite its earlier statements from
Lucas questioning the significance of a regulation's underlying
purposes to takings law, the Court in Del Monte Dunes specifically
held that inquiries into such purposes were permissible and could,
68
under certain circumstances, be performed by juries.
Nonetheless, five members of the Court specifically indicated that
they were not endorsing the "substantially
advances" test, raising
69
questions as to its continued viability.
Two years later, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,7 ° the Court
considered a landowner's claim that a wetlands regulation
qualified as a taking under both Lucas and Penn Central.71 In
doing so, the Palazzolo Court generated more doubt about the
proper application of both tests. First, the Court rejected the idea
that the plaintiff was precluded from advancing his takings claims
simply because he had acquired the property after the enactment of
the regulation at issue. For purposes of the Lucas claim, the
relevant question was whether the regulation, in existence at the
time title passed to the plaintiff, qualified as a "background
principle" sufficient to defeat the presumption of a taking caused
by a total economic deprivation.72 The Court answered that
question negatively, stating that "[a] regulation or common-law
rule cannot be a background principle for some owners but not for
others," and a background principle, therefore, could not depend
upon something as subjective as the passage of title.7 3 For
purposes of the Penn Central claim, the relevant question was
whether the existence of the regulation sufficiently informed the
plaintiffs reasonable, investment-backed expectations such that he
could not reasonably anticipate using the land free of the
66 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687
(1999).
67 Id. at 704.

68 Id. at 704-07, 721.

69 See id. at 732 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 753 n.12 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
70 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
71 d. at 615-16.

72 See id. at 626. The Court ultimately rejected the plaintiff's Lucas claim on
the basis that the regulation did not, in fact, deprive him of all economically
viable use of the land. See id. at 631-32.
71 Id. at 630.
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regulation.74 The Court answered this question negatively as well,
concluding that the takings claim was "not barred by the mere fact
that title was acquired after the effective date of the state-imposed
restrictions. 7 5
Palazzolo, therefore, established that pre-existing regulations
will not necessarily preclude a takings claim, but it left
unanswered whether and to what extent such regulations properly
should inform the takings analysis (especially under the Penn
Central framework). Indeed, two concurring Justices reached
Justice
diametrically opposing conclusions on the issue.
O'Connor, for example, concluded that "the regulatory regime in
place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps
to shape the reasonableness of [his or her investment-backed]
expectations." 76 Justice Scalia, by contrast, concluded that the preexisting nature of a regulation normally "should have no bearing
upon the determination of whether the restriction is so substantial
as to constitute a taking., 77 According to Justice Scalia, this was
true in both the Lucas and the Penn Central contexts:
The 'investment-backed expectations' that the law will take
into account do not include the assumed validity of a restriction
that in fact deprives property of so much of its value as to be
unconstitutional. Which is to say that a Penn Central taking,
is not absolved by the
no less than a total
78 taking [under Lucas],
transfer of title.
Some courts and commentators indicated that Justice O'Connor's
opinion represented the reigning view on the Court,7 9 but the Court
itself gave no clear indication as to who had the better argument.
Not only did the Palazzolo Court avoid squarely addressing
the significance of pre-existing restrictions, but following in the
footsteps of Lucas, it created further uncertainty by admitting its
74 See id. at 626.
71 Id. at 630.
76

Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

77 Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
78

Id. (citation omitted).

79 Lawson, et al., supra note 5, at 43-44 (opining that "Justice O'Connor's

view best represents controlling doctrine" and that Justice Scalia "seems to be a
minority of one"). See also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271
F.3d 1327, 1350 n.22 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Justice O'Connor's opinion and
stating that "the regulatory environment at the time of the acquisition of the
property remains both relevant and important in judging reasonable
expectations").
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past "discomfort with the logic of' Penn Central's "parcel as a
whole" doctrine. 80 This uncertainty was enhanced the very next
year by the Court's opinion in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. 81 Its prior discomfort
notwithstanding, the Court in Tahoe-Sierra swore renewed
allegiance to the "parcel as a whole" rule by rejecting a Lucas
claim brought against a thirty-two-month development
moratorium. 82 Although the plaintiffs land had been totally
deprived of economically productive use for the moratorium
period, the Court held that the plaintiffs parcel could not be
segmented temporally any more than it could be segmented
physically, and the impact of the moratorium had to be weighed
against the entire duration of possession associated with the
plaintiffs parcel as a whole. 83 Since the duration of a fee simple
estate potentially lasts forever, the Court held
that there was no
84
total deprivation such as would trigger Lucas.
By 2002, then, twenty-four years after its decision in Penn
Central, the Court had established a variety of tests with which to
adjudge regulatory takings claims and had offered confusing, if not
conflicting, statements regarding exactly when and how certain
aspects of those tests were to apply. More damaging, the Court
(despite some minor protestations from the Lucas majority)
seemed wedded to viewing takings law through the prism of due
process principles, frequently alluding to the purposes underlying
the specific governmental action at issue. All of this resulted in a
lack of predictability as to how any particular case might turn out,
making it difficult for practitioners to advise their clients and
increasing the frustration of scholars attempting to find any
doctrinal or theoretical coherence in takings law. In short, the
Court had done much to deserve the labels used to characterize its
regulatory takings jurisprudence. This area of the law truly was a
"muddle."
The stage was set for the Court to offer some
The Court
clarification, if it was only willing to do so.
demonstrated such willingness
three
years
later,
in
Lingle v.
85
Inc.
U.S.A.,
Chevron,
80 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631.

8 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
82 See id. at 327.
83 See id. at 331-32.
84 See id. at 332.

85 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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II. ENTER LINGLE
A.

History of the Litigation

At issue in Lingle was whether a Hawaii rent control statute,
aimed at curbing high gasoline prices, worked a taking under the
Fifth Amendment. 86 The statute was enacted in response to the
highly concentrated nature of Hawaii's gasoline market. When the
lawsuit in Lingle initially was filed, only six gasoline wholesalers
were conducting business in the state, and roughly fifty percent of
the state's retail stations were leased from these wholesalers by
independent lessee-dealers.8 7 In response to concerns that this
market concentration was resulting in high retail prices for
gasoline, the Hawaii Legislature enacted Act 257.88 Among other
things, Act 257 capped the amount of rent that the oil companies
could charge the lessee-dealers. 89
Shortly after the enactment of the statute, Chevron U.S.A.
brought a federal lawsuit alleging that Act 257 worked a taking of
Chevron's property, and seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief.90 Chevron subsequently moved for summary judgment on
this claim, arguing that the rent cap imposed by Act 257 did not
substantially advance any legitimate governmental interest and,
therefore, ran afoul of the first half of the Agins test. 9 ' The district
court agreed, concluding that the rent cap would not substantially
advance the state's interest in reducing retail gasoline prices.92
This was so, according to the district court, because the oil
companies would simply recoup the lost revenue occasioned by
Act 257 by raising their wholesale prices, meaning that in actuality
there would be no savings for the lessee-dealers to pass along to
consumers. 93 Because the rent cap would not result in lower retail
prices, it failed the Agins test, and the district court granted
summary judgment to Chevron.94
86 Id. at 533.
87 Id. at 532.
88 Id. at 533.
89

Id.

90 Id.

"1 Id. at 534.

Id.
93 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp.2d 1003, 1012-14 (D. Haw.
1998).
92

94 Id.
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On appeal, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the
grant of summary judgment and remanded the case to the district
court for further consideration. 95 Although the panel majority
agreed that the "substantially advances" test constituted the
appropriate legal standard, it nonetheless found that a genuine
issue of material fact remained as to whether the rent cap would
benefit consumers. 96 Accordingly,
disposition at the summary
97
judgment stage was improper.
On remand, the district court conducted a one-day bench trial
in which it heard competing expert opinions as to the
"substantially advances" issue. 9 8 The district court again ruled in
favor of Chevron, finding that any rent reductions required by Act
257 would simply be offset by higher wholesale prices, the end
99
result of which would actually be an increase in retail prices.
Based on this and other findings, the district court again held that
"Act 257 effect[ed] an unconstitutional regulatory taking given its
10 0
failure to substantially advance any legitimate state interest."
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the holding of the United States
District Court for the District of Hawaii and rejected the argument
that the district court erred in applying the "substantially
advances" test rather than a more deferential, due process
standard. 10 ' On petition by the State of Hawaii, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari 10 2 "to decide whether the 'substantially
advances' formula announced in Agins is an appropriate test for
determining
whether a regulation effects a Fifth Amendment
03
taking."'
B.

The Court's Opinion

The Court began its unanimous opinion with portentous
language: "On occasion, a would-be doctrinal rule or test finds its

9' Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 1042 (9th Cir. 2000).
96 Id. at 1042.

9' Id. at 1041.
98 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp.2d 1182, 1183-84 (D.
Haw. 2002).
99 Id.at 1187-89, 1193.
00 Id.at 1193.
10 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Bronster, 363 F.3d 846, 848-55; see also id.at
849-61 (9th Cir. 2004) (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
102 Lingle v. Chevron, 543 U.S. 924 (2004).
103Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005).
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way into our case law through simple repetition of a
phrase--however fortuitously coined."' 0 4 The remainder of the
opinion set forth why the "substantially advances" test from Agins,
which (according to the Court) had become "ensconced in our
Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence" ' 0 5 through such
repetition, was no longer an appropriate takings analysis.
After reciting the procedural history of the litigation, the
opinion provided a crash course tutorial on the law of regulatory
06
takings. Beginning with the text of the Fifth Amendment itself,'
the Court explained that the Takings Clause "is designed not to
limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but
rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper
interference amounting to a taking."' 0 7 The Court described the
primary justification for this compensation requirement to be the
fair distribution of public burdens. In other words, the Takings
Clause is designed to prevent the government "from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens that, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole." 10 8
The epitome of such an unfair burden distribution, the Court
explained, "is a direct government appropriation or physical
invasion of private property." 10 9 Indeed, the Court indicated that
its two per se tests from Loretto and Lucas flowed
straightforwardly from this notion that physical appropriation is
unduly burdensome on the landowner. Like a physical regulation,
the Court explained, the categorical tests established in Loretto and
Lucas are designed to address regulations imposing singular

Id. at 531.
Id. at 532.
106 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty or
'04

105

property... ; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
107 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987))
(emphases in original).
108 Id. (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
109 Id. James W. Ely, Jr. has pointed out that Justice O'Connor's opinion
"repeated the historically dubious proposition" that, before the Court's decision
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), "it was thought that
the Takings Clause did not reach regulations at all." See Ely, supra note 15, at
50. As noted previously in this Article, the idea that regulatory action could
affect a taking of private property had been in existence since at least the
nineteenth century. Id. at 42-43.
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burdens upon the rights of property owners.1 10
Similarly, the concept of burden distribution is equally present
in the Penn Central framework, which (the Court explicitly stated)
governs takings challenges to regulations that fall outside the
specific contexts of Loretto, Lucas, and Nollan/Dolan."1 Notably,
in discussing the Penn Central factors, the Court did not repeat the
three-part formulation from Kaiser Aetna, but rather returned to
the actual language of Penn Central itself:
Primary among those factors are '[t]he economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations.' In addition, the "character of the governmental
action"--for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion
or instead merely affects property interests through 'some
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good'--may
be relevant in
1 12
discerning whether a taking has occurred.
The Court explained that these factors, like the tests articulated in
Loretto and Lucas, primarily are concerned with the burden borne
by the property owner because they turn "in large part.., upon the
magnitude of a regulation's economic impact and the degree to
which it interferes with legitimate property interests."' 13
The unifying characteristic of all three tests, then, is that each
"focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that government
imposes upon private property rights."'1 14 And the end goal of this
focus in each test, the Court concluded, is "to identify regulatory
actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in
which government directly appropriates private property or ousts
the owner from his domain." '" 15 In other words, all three tests
(Penn Central, Loretto, and Lucas) are designed to compare how
closely the challenged regulation comes to the paradigmatic
situation of a physical taking.
In "stark contrast" to these tests, said the Court, is the

''0See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539-40.
I. Id. at 538.
112 Id. at 538-39

(quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438

U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
..
3 See id. at 540.
114 Id. at 539.
...See id.
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"substantially advances" test from Agins. 16 Unlike the foregoing
tests, "the 'substantially advances' inquiry reveals nothing about
the magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation
imposes upon private property rights. Nor does it provide any
information about how any regulatory burden is distributedamong
property owners."' 1 7 Thus, the Court concluded, the test does not
inform the central question of a regulatory takings claim--i.e.,
whether the regulation at issue is "functionally comparable to
government appropriation or invasion of private property" such
that it imposes an unfair burden on the rights of the property owner
bringing the challenge. 11 8 Rather, the "substantially advances"
formula concerns the underlying purposes and validity of the
regulation, an inquiry that "is logically prior to and distinct from
the question whether a regulation effects a taking, for the Takings
Clause presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a
valid public purpose."" 9 In those situations where the regulation
"fails to meet the 'public use' requirement or is so arbitrary as to
violate due process," the Court suggested that the property owner
indeed would be entitled to relief 1 20 But the Court indicated that
challenges to such a regulation properly fall within the parameters
of the Due Process Clause, not the Takings Clause, because "[n]o
amount of compensation can authorize such action.' 1 21 For these
reasons, the Court concluded that the "substantially advances"
formula "prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a
takings, test, and that it has no proper place in our takings
' 122
jurisprudence."
Having jettisoned the "substantially advances" test as
inconsistent with a proper takings analysis, the Court had one
remaining piece of business--to deal with the Nollan/Dolan
framework and its similar inquiries into the underlying purposes of
the challenged regulation.
As previously explained, the
Nollan/Dolan test requires that the condition imposed on the
landowner advance the same legitimate state interests that would
be served by an outright denial of the land use plan for which
116

See id at 542.
Id. (emphases in original).

118 See id.
"9

Id. at 543.

120 See id.
121 See id.
122

Id. at 540.
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approval is sought. 23
And both decisions cited Agins's
"substantially advances" language in analyzing the respective
exactions imposed in each case. 124 The question, then, was
whether the Nollan/Dolan test could survive the rejection of the
"substantially advances" formulation.
The Court answered that question in the affirmative. The
Court explained that, although Nollan and Dolan "drew upon the
language of Agins," those cases in fact did not apply Agins's
"substantially advances" formula. 25 Rather, those cases addressed
the separate context of land-use exactions concerning demands by
the government that the owners dedicate public easements in
26
exchange for obtaining necessary development approval.
Because both cases "involved dedications of property so onerous
that, outside the exactions context, they would be deemed per se
physical takings," the analytical formula developed in those cases,
unlike the "substantially advances" test, was specifically
concerned "with the degree or type of burden [the] regulation
places upon property.' 27 To determine whether that burden could
be permissible within the context of a conditional land-use
approval, Nollan/Dolan asks not "whether the exaction would
substantially advance some legitimate state interest," but whether it
"substantially advanced the same interests that land-use authorities
asserted would allow them to deny the permit altogether."' 28 Thus,
explained the Court, Nollan/Dolan is grounded not in notions of
due process but in the separate doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, which examines whether the government 29has
conditioned a benefit on the surrender of a constitutional right. 1
The opinion closed by stating that, a quarter century after
Agins, the Court would now "correct course" and abandon the
"substantially advances" formula as a suitable takings test.' 30 In
rejecting Agins, however, the Court made clear that certain other
decisions would continue to have particular significance to the
123 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); see also

Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386-88 (1994).
124Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
125 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546.
126 Id.

127 Id. at 547.
128

Id.

129 See id.
"0 Id. at 548.
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takings inquiry:
[W]e reaffirm that a plaintiff seeking to challenge a government
regulation as an uncompensated taking of private property may
proceed under one of the other theories discussed above--by
alleging a "physical" taking [under Loretto], a Lucas-type "total
regulatory taking," a Penn Central taking, or a land-use
exaction violating the standards set forth in Nollan and
Dolan.131
Thus, after years of confusion and conflict, the Court in Lingle
placed its unanimous stamp of approval on these five decisions,
setting them apart as a sort of authoritative "canon" to govern
regulatory takings analysis. In doing so, as the next Part seeks to
demonstrate, the Court made great strides toward clarifying its
regulatory takings jurisprudence.
III.
A.

EXEGESIS OF THE CANON

Defining "Exegesis"

As stated, this Article proposes that Lingle, along with the
cases it unanimously reaffirms, offers much insight and clarity into
the Court's thinking about regulatory takings. It is the aim of this
Part to prove that proposition through an exegesis of the decisions
making up the Lingle "canon." Before doing so, however, it is
necessary to identify what is meant by the use of the word
"'exegesis."
In ordinary terms, the word "exegesis" refers to an exposition,
explanation, or interpretation of a word, sentence, or other written
material. 132 One of the more frequent uses of the word, however,
occurs in connection with an interpretation of sacred writings,
especially the Christian Bible. 3 3 Thus, theologians use the word
to describe the method and process of explaining a religious
text. 134 Having analogized the decisions reaffirmed in Lingle as a
sort of authoritative "canon" for purposes of understanding
regulatory takings, it seems fitting to refer to the explanatory
interpretation of those decisions as an "exegesis."
131 Id.

132 See 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 524 (Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1991)

(defining "exegesis").
133Id.
134 See, e.g., WAYNE GRUDEM, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

108-09 (Zondervan

Publishing House 1994).
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But the use of this term is intended to convey more than a
simple exposition of the relevant judicial opinions. By choosing
the term "exegesis," this Article has in mind a specific
interpretative method that carefully looks at the language of the
text, as well as the background and circumstances of its writing, to
discover the author's intended meaning. 135 Known to theologians
as the grammatical/historical method,136 this notion of "exegesis"
is specifically contrasted to the practice of "eisegesis," which
involves the interpretation of a text by reading into it one's own
ideas or presuppositions.' 37 Moreover, one of the hallmarks of the
grammatical/historical method, at least as historically employed by
theologians in the Reformed Protestant tradition, is to view a
compiled group of associated writings (such as the individual
books of the Christian Bible) not as disjointed endeavors, but as a
single, congruent effort developed through progressive revelation.
Thus, while taking into account the language and context of the
individual constituents, each portion of the work is to be
interpreted harmoniously in light of the others, with the clearer
passages illuminating those that appear more difficult to

understand. 138
It is the aim of this Article to apply these techniques to the
interpretation of the cases comprising the Lingle "canon," viewing
them as component parts of a unified whole and interpreting each
not only through its own language and context but also through the
language and contexts of the others. The following analysis,
therefore, attempts to explain the Court's own understanding of the

131 See ROBERT L. REYMOND, A NEW SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY OF THE
CHRISTIAN FAITH 49 (2d ed. 1998); see e.g 2 JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE
CHRISTIAN RELIGION 1267 n.22 (John T. McNeill ed., Westminster Press 1960)
(1559).
136 REYMOND, supra note 135, at 49.
137 See 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 102 (Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1991)
(defining "eisegesis")
138 See REYMOND, supra note 135, at 49-52; see also WESTMINSTER
CONFESSION OF FAITH ch. I, 1 9, reprinted in G.I. WILLIAMSON, THE
WESTMINSTER CONFESSION OF FAITH FOR STUDY CLASSES 24 (2d ed. 2004). The

primary basis for this interpretive rule, at least in the Reformed tradition, is the
theological doctrine of divine inspiration--that is, each of the books in the Old
and New Testaments were written by human authors pursuant to the inspiration
of God Himself and, therefore, are "ultimately the product of a single divine
mind." See REYMOND, supra note 135, at 49-50. Although it should go without
saying, prudence demands an express disavowal that any decision of the United
States Supreme Court enjoys similar status.
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law of regulatory takings by, in effect, allowing the "canon" (as
much as possible) to speak for itself. By reading the cases in this
manner, it is possible to discern the dominant themes and
characteristics of regulatory takings law as emphasized by the
Court. Additionally, in light of those themes and characteristics, it
is possible to perceive a greater coherence in the various tests
contained within the "canon."
B.

Themes and Characteristics

Just as Lingle began its analysis by looking at the text of the
Takings Clause, so should an exegesis of the Lingle "canon" begin
with a discussion of the remedial system created by that Clause.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
among other things, that "private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation." '1 39 As understood by the
Lingle "canon," this language presents a crucial balance between
the individual rights of private property owners and the necessity
of the government to function in the best interests of the public at
large. Indeed, without the Takings Clause, the existence of both
private property and good government are at danger of extinction.
On the property rights side of the equation, the Lingle "canon"
repeatedly links the Takings Clause to the concept of burden
distribution: "One of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause
is 'to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.""'9 40 This restraint, in large part, is rooted
in the traditional understandings "regarding the content of, and the
State's power over, the 'bundle of rights' that [owners] acquire
when they obtain title to property.' 4 1
Chief among these
understandings is an expectation that an owner "will be relatively
undisturbed at least in the possession of his property."'142 That
expectation becomes unreasonable, however, without some check
139 U.S. CONST.

amend V.

140 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Armstrong v.

United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); accord Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,
835-36 n.4 (1987); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 123 (1978).
14 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
142 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436
(1982).
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on the government's ability inequitably to burden certain interests
in favor of others. As such, the "canon" makes clear that the
government is not allowed, free of charge, physically to
appropriate to itself the property of its citizens. 43 Equally clear is
that some limit must also exist on the government's regulatory
power over private property. As explained by Lucas:
[I]f the protection against physical appropriations of private
property [is] to be meaningfully enforced, the government's
power to redefine the range of interests included in the
ownership of property [is] necessarily constrained by
constitutional limits. If, instead, the uses of private property
[are] subject to unbridled, uncompensated qualification under
the police power, 'the natural tendency of human nature [would
be] to extend the qualification more and more until at last
private property disappear[ed].' 144
Accordingly, the protections afforded by the Takings Clause must
extend in some degree to regulatory action as well as to physical
appropriation.
Understanding why it is necessary to protect private property
from inequitable burden distribution, the next question is how
meaningfully to do so. In this regard, Lingle explains that the
Takings Clause is not intended to create an outright prohibition
145
against governmental interference with private property rights.
Rather, it is designed to guarantee that the owner of those rights
will receive compensation as a result of governmental
interference. 146 To use the well-known framework articulated by
Professors Calabresi and Melamed, the Takings Clause creates a
"liability rule" rather than a "property rule."1 47 In other words, the
143

See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 (describing "direct government appropriation"

as "[t]he paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation"); Lucas, 505 U.S. at

1014 (suggesting that earliest understandings of Takings Clause clearly
prohibited "a 'direct appropriation' of property or the functional equivalent of a
'practical ouster of [the owner's] possession') (citations omitted, alteration in
original); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426 ("[W]e have long considered a physical

intrusion by government to be a property restriction of an unusually serious
character for purposes of the Takings Clause."); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124

("A 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference with property can
be characterized as a physical invasion by government .... ").
'44
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 414-15 (1922)).
145

Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536.

146 See

id. at 536-37.

147 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
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compensatory system created by the Takings Clause permits the
government to acquire or destroy a private property interest upon
payment of an objective price determined by the state (i.e., a
"liability rule") instead of enforcing the subjective worth placed on
that interest by the property owner himself in a voluntary
transaction (i.e., a "property rule")., 48 Therefore, the remedy
envisioned by the Takings Clause is a forced sale at fair market
value.
This distinction between liability-rule enforcement and
property-rule enforcement also has great significance to the other
side of the takings equation: the continued existence and effective
functioning of government. Just as the "canon" emphasizes the
need to protect private property from the unequal distribution of
public burdens, so too does it emphasize the need to ensure that the
government's ability to act for the common welfare is not held
hostage by the whims of a few property owners. The liability rule
created by the Takings Clause achieves a better balance between
these competing goals than would a property rule that allows
judicial invalidation of the government's interference with
property rights, a remedy that obviously would pose risks to the
government's purpose and operations. Thus, the Takings Clause
relies on compensatory rather than injunctive relief.149 Even this
system, however, might endanger the government if every
regulation that affected private property in any way required
expenditure from the public fisc.
Consequently, the Lingle
"canon" repeatedly urges that care be taken when determining
which regulatory actions trigger the compensation remedy. As
Lingle itself explains:
[W]e must remain cognizant that 'government regulation--by
definition-involves the adjustment of rights for the public
good,' and that 'Government hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law'. 150
Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,

1090-92, 1106-08 (1972).
148 See id.
149 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543; see also id. at 544 (noting that "Chevron
plainly does not seek compensation for a taking of its property for a legitimate
public use, but rather an injunction against the enforcement of a regulation that it
alleges to be fundamentally arbitrary and irrational" and, for that reason, its
claim "does not sound under the Takings Clause").
150 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)
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The question, then, becomes how to distinguish those
regulatory actions that will trigger compensation from those that
will not. The Lingle "canon" answers this question with the buzz
words, "functional equivalence." In other words, a regulation
effects a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment when it
is "functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which
government directly appropriates private property or ousts the
owner from his domain."' 5' Regulations that require an owner to
suffer a permanent physical occupation of her property satisfy this
standard because the burdens they impose on property rights are
identical in character, if not degree, to those occasioned by a direct
appropriation via transfer of title. Like a direct appropriation, such
regulatory action affects the entire "bundle of rights" acquired by
the property owner.1 52 Among the most important rights in the
"bundle" are the rights of exclusion, possession, use, and
disposition. 153 The government's direct appropriation of a parcel
by transfer of title clearly extinguishes the prior owner's ability to
exercise each of these rights, since they are simultaneously
transferred with the title itself. In like manner, even though it is
not a direct transfer, a regulation that forces permanent physical
occupation
of the parcel similarly "destroys each of these
154
rights":
First, the owner has no right to possess the occupied space
himself, and also has no power to exclude the occupier from
possession and use of the space. The power to exclude has
traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands
in an owner's bundle of property rights. Second, permanent
physical occupation of property forever denies the owner any
power to control the use of the property; he not only cannot
exclude others, but can make no nonpossessory use of the
property.... Finally, even though the owner may retain the
bare legal right to dispose of the occupied space by transfer or
.,

and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)); accord Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
151See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539; cf Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (suggesting that
"functional equivalence" comports with earliest understandings of the Takings
Clause).
152See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435; cf Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (discussing
importance of "bundle of rights" theory to regulatory takings jurisprudence).
153See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
154 Id. (emphasis in original).
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sale, the permanent occupation of that space by a stranger will
ordinarily empty the right of any value, since the55purchaser will
1
also be unable to make any use of the property.
Because of its effect on these core property rights, regulatory
conduct that results in a physical invasion or occupation of
property ordinarily will be considered the functional equivalent of
a direct appropriation.116
Likewise, a regulation that deprives a parcel of all productive
economic value also will be considered the functional equivalent
of a direct appropriation. 5 7 Here again, although not as explicitly
as with a physical occupation, the Lingle "canon" focuses on the
similarity between the burdens imposed by a direct appropriation
of title and a regulation that renders the parcel valueless. As
demonstrated, a direct appropriation adversely affects each of the
owner's core property rights. A careful reading of the "canon,"
using the plainer passages to interpret those that are more difficult,
reveals that these same interests also are endangered by a
regulatory deprivation of the parcel's economic viability.
First, this type of regulatory conduct obviously imposes a
substantial burden on the owner's right to use the parcel, since the
regulation by definition prohibits any "economically beneficial or
productive use' 58 from which the owner can achieve a reasonable
profit.1 59 In this manner, at least from the owner's vantage point,
160
the regulation is "the equivalent of a physical appropriation.
Because the parcel no longer has real economic value to the owner,
any residual right to use the parcel is so de minimis as to be no
right at all. 16 ' In other words, like a direct transfer of title, the
Id. at 435-36 (citation omitted).
See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384
(1994); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 831-32 (1987); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426; Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
1' See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539-40; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
158 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
159 Cf Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436 ("Although deprivation of the right to use and
obtain a profit from property is not, in every case, independently sufficient to
establish a taking, it is clearly relevant.") (citations omitted); Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 136 (finding no taking where regulation "does not interfere in any way
with the present uses" of the parcel and permits owner "not only to profit.., but
also to obtain a 'reasonable return' on its investment").
160 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539-40; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.
161 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 ("[For what is the land but the profits
thereof[?]" (citing 1 E. Coke, Institutes, ch. 1, § 1 (1st Am. Ed. 1812) (alterations
155

156
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regulation effectively "denies the owner any power to control the
use of the property,"'' 62 a burden that is far removed from the
traditional expectations that accompany property ownership.' 63 In
similar manner, by eviscerating the owner's right to control what
takes place on the parcel, a regulation of this sort significantly
curtails the owner's right of possession. In effect, this type of
regulation turns on its head the traditional expectation that the
owner (rather than the state or some other third party) will have
primary dominion over, and enjoyment from, the thing to which he
holds title.1 64
Additionally, a regulation that eliminates all
productive use harms the owner's right to dispose of the parcel in
the same way as does a regulation requiring a physical occupation.
To paraphrase Loretto: "[E]ven though the owner may retain the
bare legal right to dispose of the [parcel] by transfer or sale, the
[economic deprivation] of that [parcel] by [the state] will
ordinarily empty the right of any value, since the purchaser will
16
also be unable to make any [productive] use of the property."' 1
Thus, of the four principal property rights making up the owner's
"bundle," only the right to exclude arguably can be said to remain
intact.1 66 And even though it is "perhaps the most fundamental of
in original)).
162 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436.
163 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28 (explaining that "the property owner
necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by
various measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police
power" but regulatory action by which government "subsequently eliminate[s]
all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the historical compact
recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional
culture").
164 See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436 ("[P]roperty law has long protected an
owner's expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed at least in the
possession of his property."). A comparison of the majority opinion and Justice
Blackmun's dissent in Lucas is illustrative of the Court's understanding of the
traditional meanings of dominion and enjoyment in the context of land. Justice
Blackmun maintained that the owner in Lucas retained dominion and enjoyment
because, even though he could not build on the land, he could "picnic, swim,
camp in a tent, or live on the property in a movable trailer." Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1044 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
The majority, by contrast, seemingly
considered the primary attribute of possession to be the ability to develop
"habitable or productive improvements." See id. at 1031 (majority opinion); cf
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833-34 n.2 (1987)
(discussing importance of "right to build on one's own property").
The
majority's view, of course, is the one unanimously reaffirmed in Lingle. See
Linle, 544 U.S. at 548 (unanimously reaffirming Lucas).
See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436.
166Although I cannot find textual support for it in the Lingle "canon,"
my
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all property interests,"' 16 7 this right, standing alone, obviously 1is68not
sufficient to overcome the damage inflicted on the other three.
Therefore, the Lingle "canon" clearly stakes out two
categories of regulatory conduct that are deemed to be the
functional equivalent of a direct appropriation-i.e., those that
require permanent physical occupation and those that eliminate a
parcel's economic viability. These categories are characterized by
the severe burdens that they impose on the owner's fundamental
rights of use, possession, exclusion, and disposition, and they form
a clear boundary at which the government no longer possesses the
ability to regulate without providing compensation. The extent to
which other regulations also will require the payment of
compensation depends on how closely they resemble the
categories already demarcated. The closer to the categorical
boundary a regulation comes--that is, the more it looks like a
permanent physical occupation or an economic deprivation--the
more likely it is to be considered functionally equivalent to a direct
taking.
What does not matter, at least in the primary analysis, is the
purpose for which the government promulgates the regulation or
the goals to be served thereby. This is the message not only of
Lingle itself; reading the cases together, the same message can be
found throughout the "canon." Lucas, for example, makes clear
own view is that the right to exclude does, in fact, suffer substantial harm from
this type of regulatory conduct. By effectively gutting the other three rights, a
regulation that eliminates a parcel's productive value leaves the right to exclude
little more than a hollow shell. Although it technically may be possible for the
owner legally to remove others from the parcel, that right has little practical
significance under the circumstances. The right to exclude is about more than
simply exercising authority for authority's sake. Rather, in its most meaningful
sense, it is about exercising authority over something that others desire and
consider worthwhile. As Thomas Merrill has explained, the idea of private
property is about excluding others "from a valued resource, i.e., a resource that is
scarce relative to the human demand for it." See Thomas W. Merrill, Property
and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730, 730 (1998). Thus, the fight to
exclude presupposes the value of and demand for the thing over which the right
is exercised. Once that value and demand are removed, as in the case of a Lucasstyle total regulatory taking, the mere ability to keep others away no longer has
the same significance.
167 See Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005); see also
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
168 Cf Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (categorizing complete regulatory deprivation
of value as per se taking under Fifth Amendment); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1015 (same).
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that regulations that result in a permanent physical occupation or
deprive a parcel of all productive value--hat is, those regulations
categorically considered to be the functional equivalent of a direct
appropriation by the government--require that compensation be
paid to the land owner "no matter how weighty the asserted 'public
interests' involved."' 169 In similar fashion, Loretto, Nollan and
Dolan all indicate that a broad focus on the legitimacy, and
character of the government's purpose is unrelated to the
compensation issue.7 ) All of these statements are consistent with
Lingle's explanation that inquiries into the regulation's underlying
validity are distinct from and antecedent to the question of whether
the government has taken a property interest for which just
compensation must be paid.17 ' Given this consistency, any
statements in the "canon" to the contrary must be viewed either as
apocryphal (in the same manner as is the now-defunct
"substantially advances" test) or as applicable only in specialized
circumstances (such as the limited inquiries permitted by Lucas
and Nollan/Dolan). Indeed, Lingle makes the case for both views.
Concerning the former, Lingle explicitly labels as "dicta"'' 72 Penn
Central's unorthodox declaration "that a use restriction on real
property may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to
the effectuation of a substantial public purpose." 173 Concerning
the latter, Lingle expressly distinguishes the specialized focus of
Nollan/Dolan as "worlds apart" from a generalized inquiry into the
legitimacy of the government's reason for regulating.174 Thus, as a
general rule, the "canon" makes the public purpose underlying a
specific regulatory action largely irrelevant to the question of
169See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29.
"0 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396 ("A strong public desire to improve the public
condition [will not] warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change." (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42 (noting that
government's justification that "public interest will be served" by exaction "does
not establish that the [owners] alone can be compelled to contribute to its
realization"); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 425-26 (indicating that Court would not
question determination that regulation "serves [a] legitimate public purpose...
and is within the State's police power," but "[i]t is a separate question...
whether an otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property rights that
compensation must be paid").
171 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
172 id. at 541.
173Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
174See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547-48.
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whether a regulation so burdens the owner's fundamental property
rights as to be deemed the functional equivalent of a direct
appropriation or ouster.
C.

Analytical Frameworks

Having identified the dominant themes and characteristics
established by the Lingle "canon," attention may now be turned to
the practical application of those themes and characteristics. In
light of the foregoing discussion, it is possible to perceive a greater
unity and coherence in the various analytical tests established by
the cases composing the "canon." Indeed, reading the decisions as
a unified whole, a strong case can be made that the "canon" really
establishes only two analytical frameworks--one applying to the
majority of regulatory takings claims (i.e., the "standard analysis")
and the other applying to the specific context of land-use exactions
(i.e., the "exaction analysis"). As demonstrated below, both
frameworks find root in the concept of "functional equivalence."
1.

StandardAnalysis

The majority of regulatory takings claims may be analyzed
under a standard analysis flowing directly from the themes and
characteristics articulated above. This analysis presents three basic
questions: (1) Can the owner prove that the regulation required a
permanent physical invasion or occupation?; (2) If not, can the
owner prove that the regulation worked a total economic
deprivation of his property?; (3) If not, how closely does the
regulation at issue resemble each of the two types of regulatory
action just mentioned? Each of these questions is discussed more
fully below.
a.

Question #]--Loretto

The standard analysis first asks whether the owner has proved
that the regulation requires a permanent physical invasion of his
property. 75 If so, then a taking has occurred regardless of the
extent of the invasion, and the government is required to provide
just compensation.1 76 Because regulatory action of this kind
"' See id. at 538.

176 See id.; accord Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003,
1015 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
434-38 (1982).
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77
effectively destroys each of the owner's core property rights,
neither the amount of land occupied nor the corresponding78
economic impact has any bearing on the takings inquiry.
Likewise, that inquiry is wholly unconcerned with the public
interests served by the regulation. 79

b.

Question #2--Lucas

If the regulation does not effect a permanent physical
occupation, then the second question asked is whether the owner
has proved that it deprives him of all beneficial or productive
economic value. 8 0° Such proof creates a presumption that the
regulation works a compensable taking and shifts the burden to the
government to demonstrate that "'background principles of
nuisance and property law' independently restrict the owner's
intended use of the property."' 8' The government meets this
burden by showing that the regulation accomplishes nothing more
than what could have been achieved in court via an action for
private nuisance, public nuisance, or actual necessity
to prevent
"grave threats to the lives and property of others."' 82
It is here that the analysis gets a bit tricky, since this sort of
evaluation easily raises questions about the government's reasons
for promulgating the regulation. Indeed, Lucas itself concedes that
the law of nuisance generally engages in a balancing of the harms
and benefits presented by the allegedly offending conduct,' 83 and it
identifies the similar harm-benefit language of the Court's early
84
cases with the "substantially advances" test rejected by Lingle.1
Nonetheless, interpreting Lucas in light of the other parts of the
177See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-36.
78 See id. at 434-35 (stating that permanent physical occupation constitutes a
taking even if it "has only minimal economic impact on the owner"); id. at
436-37 ("[C]onstitutional protection for the rights of private property cannot be
made to depend on the size of the area permanently occupied."); see also id. at
437-38 (intimating that economic impact of regulation may be relevant to
amount of compensation due, but not to whether taking has occurred).
179See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
180 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015, 1016 n.6
(indicating that owner must "do more than simply file a lawsuit to establish his
constitutional entitlement," but rather must "show that the [regulation] denied
him economically beneficial use of his land").
181 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-32).
182 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 n.16; see id. at 1029.
183 See id. at 1030-31.
184 See id. at 1023-24.
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"canon," it seems that the inquiry intended at this stage of the
analysis is different in nature from a due process inquiry into the
reasons underlying the regulation. Here, the analysis is concerned
not so much with the legitimacy or importance of the
government's interests as with the practical consequences
resulting from those interests. By demonstrating that the uses
prohibited by the regulation would be prohibited to the same
degree by common law nuisance, the government also
demonstrates that the owner never possessed a right to those uses
in the first place. In other words, the regulation in fact does not
burden the owner's right to use, since the "proscribed use interests
were not part of his title to begin with." 185 So, instead of proving
that compensation is not required because of the weighty interests
served by its regulation, the government really is proving that there
has been no regulation of a cognizable property interest at all.
Should the government meet this burden, then the Takings Clause
simply does not apply because, whatever else the regulation might
do, it does not deprive the owner of property. Conversely, should
the government fail to meet this burden, then the presumption of a
taking stands, and the owner is entitled to compensation.
c.

Question #3-Penn Central

Finally, if the owner can prove neither a permanent physical
invasion nor an economic deprivation, then the standard analysis
asks a third question: How closely does the regulation resemble
each of those two categories? Here, the analysis is dominated by
Penn Central, which (as understood by the Lingle "canon")
presents two (rather than three) factors. 186 The first factor looks at
the "economic impact of the regulation on the claimant" measuring
the extent of the harm in view of the owner's "distinct investmentbacked expectations." ' 87 This factor corresponds directly with the
considerations embodied in the second analytical question,
evaluating the similarity of the regulation's impact to the
categorical situation of a total economic divestment. The "canon"
thus envisions substantial economic harm and not just mere

85 Id. at 1027.
86 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39.
87 See id. (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S.

104, 124 (1978)); accord Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 426 (1982); see also Lawson, et al., supra note 5, at 47.
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diminution in value.1 8 It does well to reiterate Lingle's mantra of
"functional equivalence"; to qualify as a taking, a regulation must
"be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct
appropriation or ouster."' 89 It does well, also, to remember that
"functional equivalence" focuses on the burdens imposed on the
owner's principal rights of exclusion, possession, use, and
disposition. In light of these characteristics, this factor appears to
contemplate economic harm that approaches a near-absolute
reduction in value. 190 Moreover, the only authoritative statement
in the "canon" (from Penn Central) instructs that this harm should
be assessed with regard to the entire parcel, rather than just those
segments directly affected by the regulation. 91
That harm must also be viewed, however, through the prism
of the owner's investment-backed expectations.
Rather than
forming a separate analytical element, as is often stated, these
expectations instead are a crucial part of assessing the regulation's
economic impact.1 92
Unfortunately, the "canon" does not
thoroughly explain how this assessment should be conducted, but
188 See accord Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131 (rejecting idea "that diminution
in property value, standing alone, can establish a 'taking."'). Admittedly, the
portion of Penn Central in which this language is located is problematic after
Lingle, since it relies heavily on language and precedent more consistent with
substantive due process than with takings. Not only does this part of the opinion
talk about regulations "reasonably related to the promotion of the general
welfare," but it specifically cites as authority Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926) and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). See id.
Other portions of the "canon," however, indicate that Euclid and Hadacheck are
properly understood as due process cases that have little continuing relevance to
the Takings Clause. See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 541 (characterizing Euclid as
substantive due process case); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022-24 (listing Hadacheck as
"progenitor" of the "substantially advances" test). Nonetheless, Penn Central's
refusal to find a taking based simply on a diminution in value finds support
elsewhere in the "canon" and, accordingly, should still be considered
authoritative.
"'
544 U.S. at
537Lingle
(emphasis
190 See
MostLingle,
commentators
after
seemadded).
to understand this factor in similar
terms. See, e.g., Barros, supra note 2, at 350 n.44; Cordes, supra note 3, at 35;
Dreher, supra note 5, at 401; Echeverria, supra note 2, at 178; Lawson, et al.,
supra note 5, at 38-39.
191See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31. Although Lucas expressed its
doubt about this rule, it did not abrogate it or even explicitly contradict it. See
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. As such, the "parcel as a whole" rule must be
viewed as controlling.
192 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426 ("The economic impact of the regulation,
especially the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations, is of
particular significance." (emphasis added)).
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it does provide some important clues. To begin with, the "canon"
strongly suggests that this portion of the analysis contains both a
subjective and an objective component. By talking in terms of
"distinct investment-backed expectations," the "canon" indicates
that some consideration must be given to the unique position of the
owner.193 Put differently, the severity of the harm resulting from
the regulation, including an assessment of whether that harm can
be considered close to absolute, will depend to some degree on the
extent and characteristics of the owner's particular investment.
Indeed, this very concept underlies the common law doctrine of
vested rights, which prohibits the government from imposing new
regulations if the owner has made substantial investment in
reliance on the old ones.' 94 Thus, the "canon" supports a
consideration of the owner's subjective expectations with regard to
the property being regulated.
At the same time, the "canon" also indicates that those
expectations must be objectively reasonable.
In Lingle, for
example, the Court noted that, even though Hawaii's rent control
measure would reduce Chevron's aggregate annual rental income,
"Chevron nevertheless expects to receive a return on its
195
investment... that satisfies any constitutional standard."'
Similarly, in Penn Central, it was important that the regulation at
issue permitted the owner "not only to profit from the [parcel] but
also to obtain a 'reasonable return' on its investment."' 96 Finally,
as Lucas points out, "the property owner necessarily expects the
uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various
measures newly enacted by the State in the legitimate exercise of
its police powers,"' 97 suggesting that it is unreasonable for the
owner not to anticipate at least some regulatory changes
concerning the permissible uses of his land. Accordingly, there
seems to be a dual focus that evaluates the subjective
circumstances of the owner, viewed in light of the objective
193 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
,4 See Kent, supra note 65, at 9; see also Cordes, supra note
3, at 38 (arguing
that "the investment-backed expectations factor of Penn Central is most
reasonably understood as engaging at this same point," i.e., common law vested
rights doctrine).
195See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544.
196Penn Central,438 U.S. at 136.
197 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992);
accord Cordes, supra note 3, at 37 (discussing the Lucas concept of "regulatory
risk" as part of reasonable investment-backed expectations).
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reasonableness of the remaining value of the parcel after
permissible regulatory action.
Another clue about the meaning of investment-backed
expectations concerns the relevance of the regulatory environment
existing at the time the owner acquires the property. Recall that
this issue was raised in the separate concurrences of Justice
O'Connor and Justice Scalia in Palazzolo.198 Although the
"canon" does not pronounce a clear victor in this debate, it
intimates (contrary to conventional wisdom) that Justice Scalia
may have the upper hand. Although Justice O'Connor believed
that pre-existing regulations should inform whether the claimant's
expectations were reasonable, 99 the "canon" appears to support
the opposite conclusion. Both Lucas and Loretto maintain that the
government, "by ipse dixit, may not transform private property
into public property without compensation. " ' 200 This statement
counsels against giving much importance to a regulation that, but
for its pre-existence of the owner's title, otherwise would have
qualified as a taking. Even more to the point is the following
passage from Nollan, based on the concept of derivative title:
Nor are the [owners'] rights altered because they acquired the
land well after the [government] had begun to implement its
policy. So long as the [gov ernment] could not have deprived
the prior owners of the easement without compensating them,
the prior owners must be understood to20 have
transferred their
1
full property rights in conveying the lot.
Given these assertions, it is difficult to endorse Justice O'Connor's
view as canonical, at least in its full measure.
After considering the economic impact (measured by the
owner's investment-backed expectations), the analysis proceeds to
the second Penn Centralfactor, "the character of the governmental
action. 2 °2 Just as the first factor seeks to evaluate how closely the
regulation comes to a total economic deprivation, this factor seeks
to determine the regulation's similarity to a permanent physical
198See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
199 See id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
200 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980)); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439 (1982) (also quoting Webb's).
20 Nolan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833-34 n.2 (1987).
202 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005); Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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occupation. As explained by Penn Central: "A 'taking' may more
readily be found when the interference with property can be
characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when
interference arises from some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good., 20 3 Plainly put, compensation is mor6 apt to be due when a
regulation requires the owner to suffer an invasion or occupation,
even a temporary one, because of the greater potential adversely to
affect the owner's rights to exclude, possess, use, and dispose.2 °4
The language concerning adjustments for the general welfare
is problematic, however, because it conjures the specter of the
"substantially advances" test and its improper inquiry into the
government's reasons for regulating. Principally, this language
seems to refer to Lingle's distinction between a regulation that
singles out a small number of property owners, on the one hand,
with a regulation burdening a larger group of property owners, on
the other.20 5 I agree with Benjamin Barros that the preservation of
this distinction is regrettable, since it tends to undermine the
separation of due process and takings that the "canon" (particularly
Lingle itself) seeks to achieve.20 6 Indeed, with this distinction in
mind, some commentators already have seen the character factor
of Penn Central as a new vehicle for continued inquiries into the
regulation's underlying purposes.20 v Although such a reading is
not without some support, it is troublesome for at least two
reasons, First, the "canon" does not uniformly endorse this
viewpoint, at least with regard to government actions that directly
affect property. In contrast to the foregoing distinction made in
Lingle is the following statement from Lucas: "But a regulation
specifically directed to land use no more acquires immunity by
203 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; accord Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539; Loretto,
458 U.S. at 426.
204 Language in Loretto can be read to suggest that temporary
invasions may
qualify as takings only when committed or directed by the government. See
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432 n.9. In light of the "canon's" general emphasis on the
magnitude and distribution of burdens, however, it is difficult to understand why
a third-party invasion expressly authorized by the government necessarily is less
onerous than a temporary invasion by the government itself.
20 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
206 See Barros, supra note 2, at 354 n.56.
207 See, e.g., Echeverria, supra note 2, at 205-07; R.S. Radford, Just a Flesh
Wound? The Impact of Lingle v. Chevron on Regulatory Takings Law, 38 URB.
LAW. 437, 449-50 (2006).
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plundering landowners generally than does a law specifically
directed at religious practice acquire immunity by prohibiting all
religions., 20 8 Second, a reading that merely repackages questions
about the government's reasons for regulating cannot easily be
reconciled with the dominant themes and characteristics of the
"canon," which ostensibly attempts to divorce due process and
takings analyses.20 9
For these reasons, a better interpretation of the character
factor is one that emphasizes the concept of "functional
equivalence." Put differently, the character factor asks "whether
the government is doing something that looks very much like an
exercise of eminent domain under some other guise or is instead
simply doing things that governments have long done without
much question., 210° Again, the focus appears to be on the
consequences of the government's action, particularly its effects
on the owner's principal property rights, rather than the reasons
for that action. It must be admitted, however, that this remains one
2 11
of the more difficult issues of takings analysis, even after Lingle.

20' Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 n.14 (1992)

(emphasis in original).
209 Steven J. Eagle argues that, even after Lingle, the Court "still does not,

draw a bright line between its older due process analysis and the substance of its
newer takings analysis." See Steven J. Eagle, Lingle v. Chevron and Its Effect
on Regulatory Takings, SLO12 ALI-ABA 167, 170 (2005). In support of this
argument, Eagle notes that the Court continues to define takings "in terms of
deprivation suffered by property owners and not in terms of clearly defined
'property' taken by government." See id. I have some sympathy with this view,
as demonstrated in the Conclusion. I believe, however, that by emphasizing the
burdens placed on the owner's core property rights, and minimizing
considerations about the government's reasons for doing what it did, the "canon"
goes further toward a purely property-based test than the Court has heretofore
been willing to acknowledge.
210 See Lawson et al., supra note 5, at 50. In this regard, the character factor
duplicates some of the same considerations made in assessing the regulation's
economic impact, leading one commentator to opine that Penn Central actually
has only one factor: "whether the impact on the property owner is so severe that
it is functionally equivalent to a classic exercise of eminent domain." See
Barros, supra note 2, at 354 n.55.
21 R.S. Radford concludes that "[w]hat considerations might reasonably be
included in the 'character' calculus remains as great a mystery today as the day
Penn Central was drafted." Radford, supra note 207, at 448. While I tend to
believe that the Lingle "canon" does provide some clarity, viewing the character
factor primarily as a substitute for the concerns identified in Loretto regarding
physical invasions, I understand Radford's perplexity about this issue.
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Exaction Analysis

In addition to the standard analysis discussed above, the
Lingle "canon" establishes a second analytical framework for the
unique context of land use exactions. Here, too, the analysis
presents three central questions: (1) Does the government have an
interest sufficient to prohibit the proposed activity altogether?
(2) If so, does the exaction imposed on the owner serve that same
interest? (3) If so, is the exaction roughly proportional to the
putative impact of the proposed activity? Clearly, this analysis
addresses the government's interests in regulating to an extent that
the standard analysis does not, leading some commentators to
argue that Nollan/Dolan is on shaky footing after Lingle.21 2 While
this argument is understandable, a careful reading of the Lingle
"canon" suggests that the exaction analysis, like the standard
analysis, is rooted primarily in the concept of "functional
equivalence" and, as such, forms a coherent part of takings
jurisprudence.
Put differently, in the eyes of the Court,
Nollan/Dolan asks the same basic question as do the tests in
Loretto, Lucas, and Penn Central: Is the burden being imposed on
the property owner analogous to the physical appropriation of his
property?
a.

Question #1--Nollan (PartA)

In answering that question, the "canon" first asks whether the
government possesses a sufficient interest to deny the proposed
land use altogether. 1 3 At first blush, this question seems to be at
odds with the general disfavor the "canon" exhibits toward
evaluations of regulatory purposes. A deeper look, however,
reveals that, in practice, this question acts as a sort of analytical
placeholder that seeks to establish a logical connection between
the failure to provide compensation, on one hand, and the
imposition of an otherwise categorical taking, on the other. In this
regard, it is important to take notice of two things. First, the
"canon" never actually engages in a normative evaluation of the
212 See Pollak, supra note 60, at 930; Sarah B. Nelson, Comment, Lingle v.
Chevron USA, Inc., 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 290 (2006). Nelson goes so

far as to suggest that, after Lingle, lower courts should "perhaps disregard Nollan
and Dolan all together [sic]." Id. at 292. Given Lingle's unanimous reaffirmance
of those decisions, this suggestion seems misplaced.
213 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005); see
Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835-36 (1987).
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government's purposes. Rather, in both Nollan and Dolan, the
Court assumed that the interests advanced by the government were
legitimate and, accordingly, would justify an outright denial of the
land uses for which approval was sought. 21 4 As explained by
Lingle: "In neither case did the Court question whether the
exaction would substantially advance some legitimate state
interest.''21 5 Thus, at this stage of the analysis, it seems that any
reason identified by the government will be deemed sufficient, an
analysis that indeed is "worlds apart" from the more probing
inquiry
formerly allowed under the "substantially advances"
216
test.
Second, it must be remembered that both Nollan and Dolan
involved permanent physical invasions of the owners' land-i.e.,
21 7
regulatory action that normally would qualify as aper se taking.
This characteristic is very important to Lingle's explanation of the
two decisions, which it describes as "challenges to adjudicative
land use exactions--specifically, government demands that a
landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access to her
218
property as a condition of obtaining a development permit."
Lingle also notes that the Court has never applied Nollan/Dolan
"beyond the special context of [such] exactions." 2 19 These
statements strongly indicate that the exaction analysis applies only
to physical dedications and not to monetary exactions like impact
fees, which presumably should be analyzed under the standard
analysis articulated above. 220 These statements also can be read as
preserving the unfortunate distinction between adjudicative and
legislative exactions employed by many courts prior to Lingle. 2
Thus, it appears that the exaction analysis has a very limited
214 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. at
835-36.

215 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547.
216 See id. at 547-48.

21 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831; see also Lingle, 544 U.S.
at 547 (explaining that both cases "involved dedications of property so onerous
that, outside the exactions context, they would be deemed per se physical
takings").
2 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546.
219 See id. at 547 (alteration in original).
220 See id. (describing Nollan/Dolan as applying to "an adjudicative exaction
requiring dedication of private property") (emphasis added). At least one lower
court appears to have endorsed this understanding post-Lingle. See Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc. v. New York, 840 N.E.2d 68, 83 n.22 & n.23 (N.Y. 2005).
221 See Haskins, supra note 65, Kent, supra note 65; Goodwin, supra note 65.
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application.
More important for present purposes, however, is what these
statements reveal about the focus of this analytical framework.
Because the exactions at issue would qualify as categorical takings
under the standard analysis, this framework gives the government
a narrow opportunity to escape the normal consequence (i.e., the
payment of just compensation) resulting from such onerous
impositions. As with the standard analysis, the focus remains on
the burden forced upon the landowner (in this case, a permanent
physical invasion) and whether it is functionally equivalent to a
direct appropriation. The primary difference here is that the
government may alter the outcome by linking the permanent
physical invasion to some public interest-whatever its nature or
validity--pursuant to which it is assumed that the government may
prohibit the owner's proposed use altogether. Thus, to the extent
that it permits inquiries into the government's purposes, the
exaction analysis does so as a way for the government to mitigate
its otherwise compensable conduct.
b.

Question #2--Nollan (PartB)

Mitigation works, however, only if there is an "essential
nexus" between the exaction and the government interest that
justifies outright denial of the proposed use.2 22 This is the subject
of the second step in the analysis at which point the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions takes center stage.2 23 In the context of
exactions, that doctrine provides that "the government may not
require a person to give up a constitutional right-here the right to
receive just compensation when property is taken for public
use-in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the
22 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386
(1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987).
223 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547; see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. Although

Dolan is often seen as the genesis for applying this doctrine to the area of
regulatory takings, see, e.g., id. at 407-08 n. 12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (accusing
majority of "writing on a clean slate"), the doctrine's central ideas clearly were at
work in Loretto. Responding to the argument that the owners in that case could
avoid the regulatory invasion simply by ceasing to rent their property (because
the regulation applied only to rentals), the Court explained that "a landlord's
ability to rent his property may not be conditioned on his forfeiting the right to
compensation for a physical occupation."
See Loretto v. Manhattan
Teleprompter CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439 n.17 (1982).
Far from
establishing a brand new theory of takings, Nollan and Dolan simply made the
same point that Loretto made years earlier.
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government when the benefit has little or no relationship to the
property., 224 Stated differently, the government may not condition
the receipt of a land use permit on the owner's waiver of her right
to receive compensation for a physical invasion, unless that
condition bears a direct relationship to the granting of the permit in
the first place. Thus, assuming that some public interest warrants
an outright denial of the permit, a condition that presents an
alternative to outright denial is directly related to the granting of
the permit so long as it serves the same public interest. 225 When

this occurs, the government can be viewed (theoretically, at least)
as giving the owner a voluntary choice between the status quo of
denying the proposed land use and the alternative of approving that
use subject to the granting of an easement, etc. 26 In these terms,
the physical invasion is a permissible price paid by the landowner
for obtaining approval that he otherwise has no opportunity of
getting and to which he has no entitlement given the government's
stated interest.
When the condition fails to serve that interest, however, the
choice takes on a markedly different character. By its willingness
to allow the proposed land use under these circumstances, the
government must be viewed as abandoning its stated interest or, at
least, trading it for something the government considers more
valuable. 227 Thus, the public purpose used to justify denial of the
permit no longer has any real significance, and the status quo can
no longer be considered complete prohibition of the owner's
Accordingly, the owner is no longer
development plan.
purchasing approval that otherwise cannot be obtained, but rather
is presented with a Hobson's choice between obtaining that
approval and surrendering his right to just compensation for the
See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547 (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385).
221 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.
224

226Of course, if the prohibition would result in the elimination of the parcel's
economically productive value, then it would constitute a categorical taking
under Lucas, unless it duplicated the result that could be achieved in a commonlaw nuisance action. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1029-32 (1992). Under such circumstances, the owner may wish to
decline the offer of conditional approval and proceed under the standard analysis.
227 This is evident from Nollan's analogy to a law that forbade shouting fire in
a crowded theater, but granted dispensations to those willing to contribute $100
to the state treasury. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. Although the prohibition would

be justified based on the government's interest in protecting public safety, the
unrelated condition demonstrates that the government is no longer truly
concerned about that interest. See id.
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public easement demanded by the government. 22 The extortionate
nature 229 of this choice removes any mitigation for the physical
occupation of the parcel, and returns the analysis to the usual
understanding that this type of regulatory action is functionally
equivalent to direct appropriation of the owner's property.
c.

Question #3-Dolan

By contrast, if an essential nexus does exist, then the analysis
proceeds to the final question, which asks whether the exaction is
"'rough[ly] proportiona[l] .. both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development." 230 Once again, in light of
the entire "canon," this question must be viewed as relating
primarily to the burdens imposed on the owner's principal property
rights and the comparability of those burdens to a direct
appropriation or ouster. As stated, the physical dedication required
by the government would undoubtedly qualify as a compensable
taking outside this special regulatory context. Therefore, to avoid
paying compensation, the government must demonstrate that the
dedication likely will offset whatever adverse effects the new
development is expected to have on the public interest being
protected (i.e., the same public interest that would justify outright
denial). 23 1 The government does this by making "some sort of
individualized determination, '2 3 2 through quantifiable findings,2 33
that the exaction will help alleviate the anticipated harm. Without
this limitation, the burden suffered by the owner--a burden that
the "canon" ordinarily views as effectively destroying each of the
owner's core property rights 234-cannot in any sense be viewed as
voluntarily undertaken and, thus, remains the functional equivalent
of a direct appropriation or ouster.
228

Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385-86.

229 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
230 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005)
(quoting

Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391).
23 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395-96. For example, in Dolan, the
government was
required to show that a public pathway for pedestrian and bicycle use, which
ostensibly was designed to protect the public's interest in reducing traffic
congestion, actually had some likelihood to alleviate the traffic demand caused
by the new development. Id.
232 Id. at 391.
233 See id. at 395-96.
234 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435
(1982).
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the "canon" established by Lingle begins the
long overdue process of bringing clarity to the confused realm of
regulatory takings.
By reading these six decisions together,
interpreting each one in light of the language and contexts of the
others, it is possible to discern some much-needed consistency in
the Court's thinking about this area of the law. The "canon"
instructs that regulatory takings should be distinguished from due
process, and it accordingly places primary emphasis on the
burdens imposed on the owner's core rights of exclusion,
possession, use, and disposition rather than on the government's
purposes and goals for enacting the challenged regulation. This
emphasis, in the form of "functional equivalence," is at the heart of
the various tests created by the "canon," which form two basic
frameworks both aimed at determining whether the effects of the
regulation are tantamount to the government directly appropriating
to itself the property interests of the owner. Understanding this
emphasis and its central role in analyzing takings challenges helps
to provide a path out of the theoretical and doctrinal quagmire that
was regulatory takings jurisprudence before Lingle.
Of course, the Lingle "canon" does not answer all of the
questions about regulatory takings.
For example, while the
"canon" provides some information about the Penn Central
factors, the precise manner in which they relate to one another
remains uncertain. Similarly, as noted above, the exact nature and
role of the owner's investment-backed expectations, as well as the
character of the governmental action, remain open for debate. The
very existence of the "canon" raises questions concerning its
composition; for example, is the "canon" closed, or is there room
for further clarification? Is it possible to conceive of another type
of regulatory action that categorically will be considered the
functional equivalent of a direct appropriation? 235 Finally, given
the emphasis of the "canon" on regulations affecting land, it
remains to be seen just how the concept of "functional
equivalence" translates to regulations that affect personalty, money
235 For example, it has been suggested that a regulation completely removing
the owner's ability to dispose of his property might qualify for such categorical
treatment. See Lawson, supra note 5, at 49; cf Echeverria, supra note 2, at 203
(suggesting that interference with disposition rights, at least the right to devise to
one's heirs, should be included in character factor of Penn Central analysis).
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and other commercial paper, or intellectual property.
It also must be acknowledged that the Lingle "canon" does
not draw a perfect line between the takings and due process
inquiries. Although the "canon" makes significant progress in
tying the takings analysis to the "bundle of rights" affected by the
regulation, the focus remains in large part on the property owner
and the fairness of the burden being imposed upon her.2 36 This
continued focus, especially with regard to the distinction between
regulations affecting large numbers of property owners versus
those affecting fewer owners, hinders the Court's apparent
attempts to separate these two areas of constitutional analysis.
This separation could better be accomplished by a takings test
grounded exclusively on property
rights, without evaluations about
237
the treatment of the owner.
Related to the foregoing ideas is the unresolved role that due
process will play as the logical antecedent to a takings challenge.
The "canon" envisions that substantive challenges to the
legitimacy of regulatory action-like those raised in Lingle
itself-are properly brought under the Due Process Clause. The
Takings Clause, on the other hand, presumes the government has
acted legitimately and, therefore, is relevant logically only after
that legitimacy has been established or assumed. But whether a
property owner could obtain meaningful review of a substantive
due process challenge is highly debatable given the Court's
expressed avowal, reaffirmed in Lingle, of deferring "to legislative
judgments about the need for, and likely effectiveness of,
regulatory actions ....
,,238 In light of this deference, it is not at all
clear that the hypothetical due process challenges mentioned by
the Court have any real chance of success.23 9 In a brief concurring
opinion, however, Justice Kennedy observed that Lingle "does not
foreclose the possibility that a regulation might be so arbitrary or
irrational as to violate due process," and that "[t]he failure of a

116 See Eagle, supra note 209, at 173 (describing post-Lingle takings
law as
"based on substantive concepts such as fairness and proportionality in burdens
placed upon property owners").
237 Cf id. at 175.
238 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005).
239 See Ely, supra note 15, at 52 (calling suggestion that property owners

engage in due process challenges "futile" and "fanciful" because "[f]ederal
courts no longer provide even cursory property rights review under due
process").
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regulation to accomplish a stated or obvious objective would be
relevant to that inquiry. 24 ° Whether Justice Kennedy's view gains
any other supporters will be an important question for the future.
Despite the issues left unresolved, Lingle and the "canon" it
unanimously endorses provide a good starting point for
comprehending the Court's view of regulatory takings and
answering some thorny questions. The lasting contribution of the
Lingle "canon" is to offer a discernable path out of the maze of
what has undoubtedly been a very confused and troubled area of
the law. For this reason, the Court's decision in Lingle may well
deserve its description as "the most significant regulatory takings
case, and perhaps
one of the most important court decisions of the
24 1
era.",
modem

Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Andrew W. Schwartz, How The Government Can Avoid Property
Rights
Litigation, SM040 ALI-ABA 497, 500 (2007).
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